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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis will explain the concept and implementation 
of Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) policy in the 
Army's procurement process by analyzing the Second-Generation 
Forward-Looking Infrared Program (2nd Gen FLIR). 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Army's procurement budget continues to decline, 
forcing significant changes to service acquisition policy. One 
such change was adopting the HTI concept. HTI deviates from 
the Army's traditional vertical "stove pipe" development of 
mission area-specific solutions to a more horizontal, "inte- 
grated battlefield" method. When a component is identified as 
an HTI item, it will be universally developed and integrated 
on several platforms with minimal modifications. 
Several organizations, including Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) Battle Labs, certify potential HTI 
components. This certification process lays the foundation 
for multiple systems integration. Only three programs have 
met HTI criteria to date, they are the Battlefield Combat 
Identification System (BCIS), Digitization of the Battlefield, 
and 2nd Gen FLIR. Upon completion, each program will provide 
the Army with a pre-integrated component or sub-system. 
The HTI concept has been around for a while in the form 
of "standardization" and "common module" subcomponents, but 
misalignment of funding, schedules, and requirements have 
precluded complete implementation. Recent technical advances 
and funding constraints have caused a more earnest attempt as 
"official policy" for the Army to enact. Army HTI policy 
needs to be comprehensive in scope to provide platform inte- 
grating Program Managers (PMs) the guidance they need to 
successfully implement the HTI component. Some HTI programs 
may step across service boundaries to permit integration on 
other than Army systems.  Therefore, Army policy must poten- 
tially expand to include interservice actions. 
Since the policy is still in its infancy, research is 
needed to improve the existing process. To underscore its 
importance, an HTI operations cell was recently organized and 
staffed. It provides insight into HTI policy and serves as 
the focal point for the interaction among platform and 
component PMs. Undoubtedly, the Army has accepted HTI as a 
viable procurement policy, providing additional cost reduc- 
tions in future military procurement programs. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The research objective is to analyze and explain HTI 
policy and its implementation in the Army's procurement 
process. Analyzing the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI program will help 
understand HTI policy and implementation procedures. By 
reviewing this program and feedback from personnel involved in 
the HTI process, realistic and viable recommendations will be 
made to improve HTI policy. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question: How is the Army implementing 
an HTI procurement strategy? 
In support of the primary question, the following 
subsidiary questions were established: 
1. What is HTI and what HTI procurement policy has the 
Army adopted? 
2. What is the HTI process from development to produc- 
tion? 
3. What are the responsibilities of PMs involved in 
HTI, specifically HTI component PMs and platform 
PMs? 
4. What changes to the Army's existing HTI policy will 
improve the overall HTI procurement process? 
5. What is 2nd Gen FLIR? How, why, and when did the 
2nd Gen FLIR become an HTI program? What is its 
current acquisition strategy, specifically HTI 
requirements? 
E. RESEARCH SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis will focus on the current Army HTI policy and 
implementation procedures. Studying a specific HTI item will 
emphasize the real world problems and procedures occurring in 
the HTI acquisition process. The 2nd Gen FLIR procurement 
program is the case study used in this thesis research. 
The principal limitation of this thesis is the program's 
infancy and lack of published materials or analytical data. 
HTI is one of the most recent changes to the Army's acquisi- 
tion process. As a result, several of the literature 
resources used in this thesis are draft documents. In 
general, the concepts referenced in this thesis are accepted 
as endorsed policy. However, this thesis does not represent 
the official policy of the Department of the Army (DA) or any 
organization referenced herein. 
Throughout this study, it is assumed that the reader is 
familiar with the Army's procurement process. It is further 
assumed that the reader is familiar with basic Army and 
acquisition terminology. Appendix A provides a list of 
acronyms used throughout this thesis. 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research consisted of an in-depth literature review 
and interviews with DA civilian and military personnel. The 
literature review included HTI concept papers, briefing 
packets, meeting minutes, and memoranda. 2nd Gen FLIR program 
documentation and briefing packets, and other pertinent 
written materials were also referenced. 
Research travel was conducted to PM 2nd Gen FLIR (in Ft. 
Belvoir, Virginia), offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) (at the Pentagon, Washington, 
D.C.), and PM Abrams Tank System (PM Ml) and PM Armored 
Systems Integration  (PM ASI)  (in Warren, Michigan)  for 
personal interviews and review of on-site references. 
G.  ACRONYMS 
See Appendix. 
H.  ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of the following five chapters: 
Chapter I - Introduction: this chapter provides the 
background, objectives, scope, limitations, methodology, and 
organization of this thesis. 
Chapter II - HTI Background: this chapter provides the 
DA's HTI concept and implementation policy. It presents a 
general description of HTI policy for practical application to 
the 2nd Gen FLIR program. 
Chapter III - 2nd Gen FLIR Case Study: this chapter 
analyzes the 2nd Gen FLIR program. It includes a chrono- 
logical program summary, the program's Acquisition Plan and 
Strategy, and identifies the 2nd Gen FLIR PM's responsi- 
bilities and integration considerations. 
Chapter IV - Issues and Analysis: this chapter evaluates 
recommendations and lessons learned from the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI 
program and HTI implementation. 
Chapter V - Conclusions and Recommendations: this 
chapter summarizes the results of the research and presents 
conclusions and recommendations for further research for the 
HTI program and related areas. 
II.  HTI BACKGROUND 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will define HTI and describe how HTI 
developed into one of the Army's prime modernization 
strategies. It will describe HTI's concept of operation to 
include its three enabling strategies, the process for 
implementation, and its management organization. Finally, 
this chapter discusses some of the strategy's general 
advantages and disadvantages. 
B.  DEFINITION 
HTI is defined as the application of common enabling 
technologies across multiple systems to improve the force's 
warfighting capability.  [Ref. 1] 
HTI is a departure from the traditional "Stovepipe" 
processes that have lost utility in today's austere fiscal 
environment. HTI simultaneously integrates dissimilar weapons 
systems that fight together as units with common technology, 
through new acquisitions, system component upgrades, or 
product improvements. The HTI process, if implemented 
effectively, results in warfighters "seeing the same 
battlefield" while enjoying "common situational awareness." 
[Ref. 2] 
C.  HISTORY 
Following the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Army's leadership recognized the need to 
modernize today's Army to prepare for the conflicts of 
tomorrow. General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the 
Army (CSA), introduced his strategy to carry the Army's 
modernization efforts to the year 2010. The strategy is aptly 
called, "The Force XXI Campaign Plan" (Figure 1).  [Ref. 3] 
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Figure 1.  Force XXI Campaign Plan 
The essence of this plan's equipment modernization effort 
is to break free of old concepts by using command and control 
technology to leverage the power of the information age. 
General Sullivan stated, "We have rescoped our modernization 
vision to improve our ability to acquire and assimilate 
Post-Industrial technology. Modernization is no longer about 
systems: it is about capabilities."  [Ref. 4] 
Although the term HTI as explained in the Army's modern- 
ization strategy, is new, the foundation of the concept itself 
is not. As early as 1976, common technological capabilities 
through modernization were being explored in a Forward Looking 
InfraRed (FLIR) system. Common modules, as defined later, are 
the foundation of the of the HTI concept. The 1976 FLIR 
design manual states "The modular approach offers performance 
and configuration control comparable with custom FLIR designs, 
but promises significantly reduced cost through reliance on 
common equipment." [Ref. 5] These benefits, described in the 
1976 FLIR manual, mirror some of the benefits expected from 
today's HTI concept. Unfortunately, common modules didn't 
survive for various political and technical reasons. Today's 
HTI strategy shouldn't suffer the same fate because of reduced 
new-start program funding and emphasis from high level Army 
officials. 
Common modules have been used at basic technology levels 
for many years. Several systems have integrated common items 
such as heaters, seats, and stop light housings. However, 
these components do not represent the high technology develop- 
ment and commonality directed by the CSA. 
There are a number of recent Army modernization programs 
employing the HTI initiative at the integrated and advanced 
technological level envisioned in the Force XXI Campaign Plan. 
For example, some OH-58D, UH-60, and AH-64 aircraft have inte- 
grated frequency-hopping communications (SINGARS) and naviga- 
tion (Global Positioning) systems, along with common aircraft 
survivability equipment, such as radar jammers and warning 
receivers. None of these examples employed the HTI strategy 
and implementation measures as outlined in this thesis. 
D.  CONCEPT 
The Army modernization vision supports the Army's goal of 
Land Force Dominance to enable decisive victory in any 
strategic or tactical environment. To achieve this, the Army 
must meet five objectives:  [Ref. 6] 
1. Project and sustain the force 
2. Protect the force 
3. Win the information war 
4. Conduct precision strikes 
5. Dominate the maneuver 
7 
To operate effectively in future environments, the Army 
must function as a totally integrated team. That integrated 
team will be one in which Combined Arms forces share the same 
common picture of the battlefield so they can communicate and 
target in real time. This requires integrating systems and 
capabilities across multiple programs and mission areas. HTI 
is the modernization strategy designed to facilitate the 
transition to a more dynamic and integrated fighting force. 
Further accelerating the Army's acceptance of the HTI 
concept is the austere fiscal environment in which DoD now 
operates. The RDA budget for the 1990's is 22% less than the 
budget in the 1970's. [Ref. 7] As the budget becomes even 
more constrained, and the Army continues to downsize, alter- 
natives to current procurement practices must be researched. 
Traditional methods of developing and procuring material and 
upgrading weapon systems have become less cost effective. 
[Ref. 8] The HTI strategy helps the Army optimize its modern- 
ization funds, while simultaneously integrating the total 
force. 
HTI is a deviation from the traditional method of 
vertical procurement. As a new way of doing business, it 
reevaluates current methodologies. Convincing the acquisition 
work force that HTI is an acceptable method is one of the most 
significant barriers the program must overcome. However, with 
continued emphasis and direction from the Army's top leaders 
the HTI strategy will remain a viable modernization program. 
This shift in the procurement paradigm will be explored 
further in the analysis chapter of this thesis (Chapter IV). 
Currently,  there  are  three  separate  methodologies 
envisioned for applying the HTI strategy to the force.  Each 
facilitates developing a new system or upgrading systems 
already in the Army's inventory.   The three methods are: 
[Ref. 9] 
1. Combining existing systems to form a new system or 
capability. An example of this method is merging the HMMWV, 
Stinger, and an advanced FLIR to create Avenger. 
2. Combining technology already existing and embedded 
in one or more dissimilar systems. An example is the fully 
interoperable digitization communication system developed from 
digital systems existing in the M1A2 Abrams, Aviation, and 
fire support weapon systems. 
3. Directly  inserting  emerging  technologies  into 
existing systems horizontally across the force. An example is 
the Battlefield Combat Identification System transponder. 
Although completely different in their approach, each method 
provides the horizontal integration base necessary to be HTI. 
Discussions on HTI commonly reference the A-Kit and B-Kit 
(Figure 2). The A-Kit is the system (platform) unique hard- 
ware designed to integrate the common subsystem. The B-Kit is 
the common subsystem (module) developed to be simultaneously 
integrated into several platforms. Horizontally integrating 
the B-Kit into numerous Army systems via the A-Kit represents 
the third methodology mentioned above. This integration term- 
inology is indicative of today's HTI strategy. 
E.  ENABLING STRATEGIES 
The Army will identify enabling strategies that improve 
and enhance force capability. These enabling strategies will 
guide HTI, so they must be clearly defined and agreed upon up 
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Figure 3.  HTI Enabling Strategies 
1.   »Own the Night" 
This ensures the capability to conduct continuous, 
around-the-clock operations to achieve tactical surprise and 
maintain momentum. Second Generation Forward Looking Infra- 
Red (2nd Gen FLIR) technology, the "Own the Night" strategy's 
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primary program, has matured and can be inserted into air- 
craft, tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and command and 
control vehicles. 2nd Gen FLIR increases range, fields-of- 
view, and resolution compared to previous thermal imaging 
systems.  [Ref. 11] 
2. "Battlefield Combat Identification" 
Enhancing both situational awareness and the target iden- 
tification process will reduce the risk of fratricide. Target 
identification allows the warfighter to properly distinguish 
friend from foe throughout the target engagement process. 
Situational awareness helps warfighters know their location 
and disposition on the battlefield relative to the other 
combatants. Milli-Meter Wave (MMW) technology provides a 
solution to the near-term challenge.  [Ref. 11] 
3. "Battlefield Synchronization at Brigade and 
Below"-- Digitization (Third Wave Battle Command) 
Rapid exchange of information through high-speed digital 
networks and data transfer systems is an absolute requirement 
for Army modernization. Simply stated, this gets the right 
information to the right warfighter at the right time. 
Opportunities to exploit digital technology are being incor- 
porated into the material acquisition process. This enabling 
strategy has been referred to as "digitization." As a central 
element of the Army's modernization vision, digitization must 
provide the architecture for the integrated battlefield. 
Advanced sensors, very high speed digital computer processors, 
fiber-optic networks, and state-of-the-art transmitters and 
receivers can develop and rapidly transfer battlefield infor- 
mation in digital format. This provides warfighters common 
situational awareness while increasing the tempo and lethality 
of combat operations. Success of the digitization effort 
requires developing common software standards, formats, and 
protocols. These critical elements will enable system-to- 
system and computer-to-computer linkages resulting in real- 
time awareness on the battlefield.  [Ref. 11] 
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F. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
New strategies, like HTI, that are both innovative and 
complex require a well-planned management structure. An 
"Umbrella" structure that effectively links the acquisition, 
material development, combat development, and user communities 
is critical. On the basis of this complex management require- 
ment, the Department of the Army (DA) established a General 
Officer Working Group (GOWG) as the central authority for HTI 
initiatives and programs. The GOWG membership includes HQDA 
representatives from Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 
Plans (DCSOPS), Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, 
Development, and Acquisition) (ASA RDA), Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (PA&E), Assistant Secretary of the Army (Force 
Modernization) (ASA FM) and Director of Information Systems 
for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC 4), 
along with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Army 
Material Command (AMC) representatives. [Ref.12] This 
distinguished group establishes the high-level commitment 
needed to provide specific intent and guidance, assistance in 
the resolution of critical issues, and strategic management 
oversight. The GOWG is absolutely imperative if the HTI 
process is to break down existing bureaucratic barriers 
ingrained in the traditional vertical development process. 
HTI management structure below the GOWG will be built 
around existing organizations, teams, and structures. 
Utilizing the established structure allows immediate activity 
in the three enabling strategies. It also provides a well 
established and proven audit trail for managers to follow in 
the development of their HTI program. 
G. IMPLEMENTING HTI 
The HTI implementation process will comply with existing 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and Army procurement 
regulations DoD 5000.1, 5000.2, and AR 70-1.  This provides 
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each Program Manger (PM) with the procedural guidelines 
necessary to prepare for each milestone decision. 
Implementing HTI is a methodical development process 
involving several systemic acquisition processes, including 
the life-cycle model and the prioritization process. The 
following recommended method for implementing of a given HTI 
strategy serves as a framework that allows the strategy to 
evolve. 
1.   Battle Labs and Louisiana Maneuvers 
Much like any procurement program, the HTI process begins 
with the operational requirements process. Candidate HTI 
enabling strategies originate in the same manner as other 
requirements within the user community: through Army schools 
and centers, Louisiana Maneuvers, or Battle Labs. Since the 
Louisiana Maneuvers and Battle Labs are recently created 
organizations, and because they are an integral part of the 
HTI process, a brief description is warranted. 
a. Louisiana Maneuvers 
Louisiana Maneuvers provides a means for senior 
leadership to focus on critical growth issues like HTI 
technology, make policy decisions, and guide the allocation of 
resources. Any issue selected for scrutiny under the 
Louisiana Maneuvers program is assigned a major command as 
proponent and an element of the Army staff as sponsor. 
Together, they examine the issue using simulations coupled 
with actual troop formations at existing training facilities, 
to formulate a recommendation for the Louisiana Maneuvers 
Board of Directors and the CSA. [Ref. 13] Using Louisiana 
Maneuvers in the earliest stages of the HTI process gives the 
Army an economical test bed to confirm the feasibility and the 
advantages and disadvantages of integrating specific tech- 
nology across the force. 
b. Battle Labs 
TRADOC has organized six Battle Labs to identify, 
develop, and experiment with new warfighting concepts and 
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capabilities. Battle Labs are designed to: facilitate the 
flow of new ideas; examine battlefield dynamics and the impact 
capabilities offered by new technologies have on the future 
battlefield; and integrate promising concepts across the Army. 
The six Battle Labs (Figure 4) and their fundamental missions 
are:  [Ref. 14] 
1. Early Entry Lethality and Survivability Battle 
Lab - Study power projection and the early entry 
force concept. 
2. Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab - Study 
the application of combat power throughout the 
depth and space of the battlefield. 
3. Mounted Battle Space Battle Lab - Study capabil- 
ities for engaging the enemy outside his range, 
both day and night. 
4. Dismounted Battle Space Battle Lab - Study capabil- 
ities for engaging the enemy outside his range, 
both day and night. 
5. Battle Command Battle Lab - Study aspects of combat 
and force development required for commanding the 
combined arms force. 
6. Combat Service Support Battle Lab - Study aspects 
of logistical support needed to sustain the 
combined arms force on tomorrow's battlefield. 
Battle Labs provide a network which electronically 
and intellectually link the Battle Labs, TRADOC schools, R&D 
community, academia, and other national agencies. Experimen- 
tation by the Battle Labs screens potential HTI technologies 
and their application horizontally across the force. TRADOC 
policy is to assign a specific Battle Lab the mission of 
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Figure 4.  Battle Labs 
Once the technology emerges from the Battle Labs, 
Louisiana Maneuvers, or other organizations, TRADOC, under the 
direction of the HQDA GOWG, prepares an HTI proposal and 
presents it to the VCSA and ASA(RDA) .   VCSA and ASA(RDA) 
review the proposal,  which includes  the Mission Needs 
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Statement and supporting documents, before declaring the tech- 
nology an HTI initiative or enabling strategy. 
2.   Special Task Force (STF) 
If the proposed HTI strategy is approved by the VCSA and 
ASA(RDA), a Special Task Force or appropriate management 
structure is chartered by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 
(VCSA) to develop a master plan outlining the scope of the 
effort. The STF should maintain a staff of approximately 3 0 
personnel from TRADOC, AMC, and PEO/PM, that are resourced 
directly through HQDA. Recommended STF organizations will 
include the following (Figure 5): 
a. User Advisory Group: Contains Two-Star level 
representatives from TRADOC schools, PEOs, and other 
communities, such as Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM). 
Provide critical top-level insight, review, and guidance to 
the STF and STF Chairman. 
b. STF/User Advisory Group Chairman: General Officer 
or Senior Executive Service (SES) who is the senior manager of 
the STF and coordinates and directs the User Advisory Group 
and the STF. 
c. Special technical Advisor: Top specialist in the 
particular HTI technology being developed. 
d. Deputy for Requirements and Deputy for Acquisitions: 
Intermediate level management (06 level) responsible for 
executing specific requirements and guidance received from the 
STF Chairman and User Advisory Group. 
e. Operational  Suitability  Team,  Technical  Team, 
Procurement Team, and Programmatic Team: Teams organized from 
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The STF continues until the Statement of Work (SOW) of 
the Request for Proposal (RFP) is written and Milestone I is 
completed. During this time, the STF produces the technical 
assessment, trade-off analysis, best technology approach, 
Operational Requirement Document, Management Development 
Execution Package (MDEP) proposal, prioritized systems/force 
packages, and other management recommendations. [Ref. 15] If 
the Milestone I decision establishes the HTI strategy as a 
formal acquisition program, the STF is dissolved and the 
designated PEO/PM assumes responsibility for the program. 
Thus far, each of the three enabling strategies have had 
an STF chartered by DA. 
3.   Program Management 
In traditional weapon system acquisitions, a PEO/PM is 
responsible for developing and applying a specific technology 
to individual systems. However, when applying technology 
across multiple systems, a different approach is required. 
There are two Program Management alternatives recommended for 
an HTI strategy.  [Ref. 9] 
a. For complex and multiple system HTI strategies, a 
separate PM under the control of an established PEO will 
manage the common technology (B-Kit) development. System PMs 
are responsible for integrating the specific technology into 
their system (A-Kit). 
b. For less complex integration or limited system 
requirements, a single PM will be responsible for technology 
acquisition and integration in appropriate systems (A&B-Kits). 
This management structure may be more appropriate when all 
systems to be integrated fall under the responsibility of one 
PEO. 
PEOs and PMs will utilize established acquisition manage- 
ment procedures in HTI programs. ASA(RDA) will ensure the 
technology insertion is completely synchronized through 
management oversight of the respective PEOs and PMs. PEO/PM 
for both the common technologies and receiving systems manage 
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HTI as a part of planned systems improvements and milestone 
upgrades. They are responsible for ensuring the weapon 
systems acquisition strategy and acquisition plan are designed 
to incorporate a horizontal approach. [Ref. 12] 
4. PM Armored Systems Integration (PM ASI) 
Recognizing the Army's emphasis on the HTI concept, PEO 
Armored Systems Modernization (PEO ASM) organized an HTI 
Directorate under the control of an Armor officer (06) . 
Effective FY 95, the HTI Directorate became a new Program 
Management office called PM ASI. PM ASI serves as the HTI 
initiatives focal point for PEO ASM and several other external 
organizations touched by HTI strategies. Their current HTI 
mission and function statements follow:  [Ref. 16] 
MISSION 
a. Provide the PEO ASM with an independent engineering staff. 
b. Apply common technologies across multiple systems to improve 
the warfighting capability of the force. 
c. Provide simultaneous integration and fielding of technology 
into different types of weapon systems that fight together 
as units or task forces, thereby improving the force. 
d. Apply a process that supports an integrated battlefield 
architecture. 
e. Allow weapon systems such as the M1A2, M2A3, AH-64C/D, and 
others, to rapidly see, acquire, and engage threats while 
sharing the same information with equal clarity, using 
advanced technologies and digital communications. 
f. Provide independent technical advice and recommendations on 
issues concerning system and platform integration, engineer- 
ing, quality, testing, configuration management, CALS, 
simulation, environmental issues, software, Gen II FLIR, 
Battlefield Synchronization and Digitization, ESLR/BCIS/IFF, 
GPS DAWV, and specifications, standards and technical data. 
g. Provide PEO policy in the above areas (paragraph f.). 
h.  Serve as PEO level liaison with other PEOs, PMs, MCD, MSCs, 
and other government agencies and contractors. 
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FUNCTIONS 
a. Management - Understand how HTI is managed and provide 
the direction for implementing and managing and integrat- 
ing technology/requirements across the force. 
b. Support - Provide technical support to the ASM PMs and 
support acquisition strategies to optimize the use of 
modernization funds. 
c. Oversight - Oversee all ASM PM technical activities to 
make sure integration of systems and capabilities occur 
across multiple programs and mission areas. 
d. Commonality - Perform necessary monitoring and coordina- 
tion with appropriate PMs to assure that maximum common- 
ality is achieved across ground vehicle systems. 
e. Spokesperson - Be the PEO spokesperson to contractors and 
government agencies for technical matters related to managed 
ground vehicle systems, i.e., act as PEO's "mouthpiece." 
f. Expertise - Be the source of expertise for HTI functions, 




g. Efficiency - Manage resources including contractor resources 
and work with PMs to accomplish tasks in the most cost effec- 
tive manner. 
h.  Driving Force - Spearhead activities to improve system(s) 
technical performance, schedule, cost and benefits. 
i.  Compliance/Enforcement - Be the PEO's "watchdog" to ensure 
that all offices are complying with the PEO's directions 
and philosophy. 
PM ASI, however, is not an organization specifically- 
directed or funded by DA. They have limited direct power, 
responsibility, and decision making within the Program Manage- 
ment structure of any HTI enabling strategy. However, PM ASI 
does have a necessary function in the HTI process. They 
provide a centralized and consolidated medium for PEO ASM PMs, 
HTI PMs and DA Staff to funnel a variety of horizontal inte- 
gration issues. 
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5.   HTI Program Resourcing Alternatives 
If HTI is to succeed, HQDA must allocate sufficient 
funding for the individual enabling strategies. These 
strategies will be resourced through one of three alternative 
methods, depending upon the program's significance, 
complexity, and visibility.  The three alternatives are [Ref. 
9] : 
a. Establish a single control Management Decision 
Package (MDEP) to consolidate all funds associated with the 
development, acquisition and application of each approved HTI. 
This assures centralized control and decentralized management. 
All funding for "A Kits" will be executed by receiving system 
PMs. All funding for "B Kits" will be executed by the PM 
managing the HTI item. No new Program Elements (PEs) or 
projects will be created except as necessary. 
b. Place all funds related to the HTI development, 
acquisition, and application in a single PM controlled MDEP 
with subordinate, dedicated PEs and Special Study Numbers 
(SSNs).  This assures centralized control and execution. 
c. Place all funds in respective receiving system 
MDEP's modification lines. This assures decentralized control 
and execution of HTI. 
Currently, the recommended method of resourcing HTI 
programs is by the first method described above. The MDEP is 
established to provide funding for both common government 
furnished hardware and for actually inserting and integrating 
the common hardware into the designated weapon systems. [Ref. 
12] By providing alternative resourcing, DA has retained the 
flexibility to tailor the program based on the specific goals 
for each enabling strategy. 
H.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
DA has envisioned HTI as an efficient method of affecting 
the modernization objectives outlined in the "Force XXI 
Campaign Plan."  Several advantages and disadvantages have 
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been considered before DA decided to embrace HTI as one of the 
Army's principal methods of optimizing its modernization 
dollar. The following positive and negative arguments have 
been presented in documentation supporting HTI: 
ADVANTAGES 
Horizontal integration of technology across the Army provides 
an operational advantage to the force.  The Army will realize 
increased capabilities creating fewer incidents of fratricide, 
reduced crew workload, shortened delays in decision-making and 
response time to critical actions, and better real-time com- 
munication between sensor and shooter.  [Ref. 17] 
HTI has the potential to significantly lower the overall life- 
cycle cost of systems being integrated, by focusing engineer- 
ing development on the HTI subsystem. The savings in life-cycle 
cost will be possible because of the following benefits:  [Ref. 
18] 
a. Technology in the form of common modules or subsystems 
integrated in multiple platforms reduces cost through 
economy-of-scale purchases. 
b. Repair parts and spares will be common for HTI sub- 
systems allowing economies-of-scale for logistical 
support. 
c. Test requirements during the HTI subsystem development 
will be reduced and streamlined.  This consolidated test- 
ing reduces the risk of schedule slips for individual 
systems.  However, it also makes every system dependent 
on the HTI test schedule, which increases the impact of 
one schedule slip. 
d. Planned product improvements and future upgrades are 
facilitated by common subsystems. 
e. Fielding common subsystems reduces operational and 
support costs and more efficiently uses manpower 
(especially maintenance personnel) by concentrating 
critical skills towards one major effort as opposed 
to several. 
HTI helps ensure that the Defense Industrial Base is kept 
"warm" and productive, while maintaining its technological 
edge. 
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As lucrative as these advantages seem, there remains 
potential disadvantages that require careful consideration. 
Possible drawbacks to the HTI  strategy include:      [Ref.   11] 
DISADVANTAGES 
1. Realigning program schedules,   changing technical approaches 
and altering funding strategies  to  incorporate technology or 
implement product  improvements  could increase up-front  costs. 
2. Older generation systems may require major modifications 
before  they can accept newer-generation technology. 
3. Cost,   schedule,   and performance risks may be greater when 
trying to integrate compatible or common subsystems with 
dissimilar weapon systems. 
4. Funding management,   administrative processes,   and developing 
operational  requirements may be increasingly difficult when 
attempting to incorporate technology into multiple weapon 
systems. 
5. Even though the  Industrial Base  is kept   "warm"   as  stated 
earlier,   the  total number of  specific producers may be 
reduced. 
This list of major advantages and disadvantages is not 
meant to be all inclusive. These and additional concerns are 
discussed in the analysis chapter  (Chapter IV)  of this thesis. 
I.      SUMMARY 
The preceding sections of this chapter examined the back- 
ground of the HTI strategy. First HTI was defined and a 
historical perspective presented. Next, the HTI concept was 
examined. This section discussed the enabling strategies, the 
management structure, implementation procedures, and briefly 
described the unique organizations involved in the HTI 
process. The chapter concluded with general advantages and 
disadvantages of the HTI strategy. The following chapter 
reviews the implementation of the "Own the Night" enabling 
strategy, specifically the 2nd Gen FLIR acquisition program. 
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III.  SECOND GENERATION FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED 
CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will detail the 2nd Gen FLIR Acquisition 
Program. The first section is an overview of 2nd GEN FLIR 
equipment and it's development history. The next section will 
discuss the program's Acquisition Plan. Finally, the 
program's acquisition and procurement strategy will be 
examined. 
B. OVERVIEW OF 2ND GEN FLIR 
As indicated in Chapter II, 2nd GEN FLIR provides the 
Army with a system that retains the force's "Night Fighting" 
advantage. 
1.   System Description 
The 2nd GEN FLIR HTI Program utilizes the A&B-Kit HTI 
concept explained in Chapter II. Since it is representative 
of this program it is necessary to describe both kits, but 
this chapter emphasizes FLIR (B-Kit) procurement. A-Kit 
discussion will be limited to coordination and integration 
aspects for the B-Kit. 
a. B-Kit 
The 2nd GEN FLIR HTI module is based on developing 
a standard thermal sensor, the "NV-80" B-Kit. This FLIR 
module will be common for the Army's current and future target 
acquisition systems. The Kit (Figure 6) contains the core 
thermal imaging system components that are common to all 
vehicle platforms, such as the infrared focal plane array 
detector, cryogenic cooler, infrared optics, and associated 
electronics.  [Ref. 19] 
b. A-Kit 
Platforms selected for B-Kit integration must be 
modified to accept the module, these modifications are called 
A-Kits. A-Kits include such items as head assembly, displays, 
25 
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interface electronics, brackets, and connectors.  Each A-Kit 
is unique to the platform type involved.  [Ref. 19] 
2.   Background 
Following Operation Desert Storm, where the Army's night 
fighting capabilities were showcased, the CSA and TRADOC 
Commander recognized the importance of maintaining our 
technical edge in thermal technology. "Own the Night" became 
one of the Army's principle modernization objectives. Within 
this strategy 2nd GEN FLIR became the prime acquisition 
program to replace first generation thermal imaging tech- 
nology. Almost simultaneously, the HTI modernization concept 
gained acceptance among senior Army officials. These two 
events, the need for a new generation thermal sight and a new 
modernization strategy, were merged to create the 2nd GEN FLIR 
HTI Program. 
On 8 February 1993, DA officially established the 2nd GEN 
FLIR HTI STF. By 8 March 1993, the STF was co-located with 
the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab at Fort Benning, 
Georgia. Figure 7 is the 2nd Gen FLIR STF's organization 
chart. 
The User Advisory Group (UAG) was co-chaired by the 
Commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School (who is 
also Director, Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab) and the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and 
Technology. Participants from key user schools, development 
centers, program executive offices and PM offices, Army 
Material Systems Analysis Command and the TRADOC Analysis 
Command comprised the STF.  [Ref. 20] 
On 2 August 1993, five months after the STF was formed 
and virtually sequestered at  Fort Benning,  the TRADOC 
Commander approved the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD).  This was followed by DA approval on 9 December 1993, 
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On 24 November 1993, the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) 
designated 2nd GEN FLIR as an Acquisition Category II (ACAT 
II) program. Development responsibility was assigned to 
Program Executive Officer Intelligence and Electronic Warfare 
(PEO-IEW) . Also a Product Manager for 2nd GEN FLIR (PM FLIR) 
was established and assigned under the Project Manager Night 
Vision Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (PM 
NV/RSTA) for overall program management within PEO-IEW. [Ref. 
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Following the ACAT II decision and DA approval of the 
ORD, a competitive Request For Proposal (RFP) was issued in 
December 1993. One proposal was received from the team of 
Texas Instruments and Hughes Aircraft Co. The single proposal 
forced the proposal to be evaluated as a non-competitive 
procurement. [Ref. 22] The contract was let to the above 
mentioned team in July 1994. 
In July 1994, the Milestone I/II decision was rendered by 
the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC). This 
decision advanced 2nd GEN FLIR to the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. A Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) exit criteria was also approved, with a PEO 
level In-Progress Review (IPR) scheduled for FY 97. The IPR 
will evaluate whether the LRIP criteria have been satisfied. 
[Ref. 23] 
The Milestone I/II decision culminated a streamlined 
process to propel 2nd GEN FLIR into the EMD phase. From 
February 1993 to July 1994, 2nd GEN FLIR moved from undefined 
requirements, through the RFP process to a successful ASARC 
review and decision, due primarily to the efforts of the STF 
and PM FLIR. This streamlined procedure may set a precedence 
for future HTI technology developments. 
Following the ASARC review, the STF was formally 
dissolved and PM FLIR assumed full program responsibility. In 
December 1994, PM FLIR successfully completed the Preliminary 
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Design Review (PDR) for the 2nd GEN FLIR.  The program is 
scheduled for the Critical Design Review in April 1995. 
C.  ACQUISITION PLAN 
1. Statement of Need 
The 2nd Gen FLIR will improve the Army's thermal imaging 
capability. This will increase target detection, recognition 
and identification capabilities during day, night or through 
smoke, fog, or other battlefield obscurants. [Ref. 24] 
Improving our visual capabilities allows Army forces to engage 
the enemy at extended ranges, while simultaneously reducing 
the number of fratricide incidents. 
The 2nd Gen FLIR Program is one of the first procurement 
programs to fully embrace the Army's HTI strategy. The 
program will develop a common thermal module (B-Kit) that can 
be horizontally integrated into a variety of platforms. By 
procuring a common B Kit the Army will realize procurement 
economies of scale, reduced Life Cycle Cost, and common 
situational awareness. 
The 2nd Gen FLIR Acquisition Plan includes all platforms 
identified in the ORD as improved FLIR candidates.  However, 
only four platforms have currently been approved and funded 
for 2nd Gen FLIR integration: the Abrams Main Battle Tank 
(M1A2), Bradley Fighting Vehicle (M2A3), Armored Gun System 
(M8) , and the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System 
(LRAS3).   [Ref. 24]   Figure 8 presents all the platforms 
considered for 2nd Gen FLIR integration with the four funded 
platforms outlined. 
2. Applicable Conditions 
As stated in the background section, the program 
completed all requirements necessary to successfully complete 
the Milestone Decision Review I/II. Having received ASARC 
approval, the program is entering the EMD development phase. 
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3. Cost 
a. Life Cycle Cost: The program's LCC estimate is for 
offical use only. If specific information on the program's 
LCC estimate is required reference Annex B of the 2nd Gen FLIR 
Integrated Program Summary (IPS). 
b. Design-To-Cost: A Design-to-Cost (DTC) requirement 
was included in the 2nd Gen FLIR RFP. The contract included 
an award fee to incentivize the contractor to meet the 
proposed Design-To-Unit-Production-Cost (DTUPC). The DTUPC 
began at EMD contract award and the Government will monitor it 
throughout the contract's life to assess the program's status. 
The DTUPC quantity will be the LRIP quantity of 400 units and 
a learning curve will be applied based on the contractor's 
experience with similar production efforts.  [Ref. 24] 
c. Application of Should Cost: A should cost analysis 
was not required or conducted for 2nd Gen FLIR EMD or LRIP. 
4. Performance 
The 2nd Gen FLIR provides an enhanced thermal imaging 
capability which doubles the current combat identification 
range. Specific improvements include a 55 percent increase in 
target acquisitions, a 44 percent increase in target hits, and 
improved identification capabilities in limited visibility. 
[Ref. 25] These improvements facilitate command and control, 
weapons effectiveness and situational awareness. Acquisition 
of the 2nd Gen FLIR maintains the Army's edge in night vision 
technology. 
As an HTI acquisition strategy, the Army expects the 
B-Kit to provide several enhancements via low cost modular 
upgrade modifications:  [Ref. 24] 
1. Expandability of the digital buss in modular incre- 
ments 
2. Increased dynamic range to accommodate detector 
improvement s 
3. Increased frame rate 
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4. Increased electronic bandwidth 
5. Increased processor throughput 
6. Increased frame memory 
The 2nd Gen FLIR HTI program is expected to facilitate 
ample future growth by providing interfaces for Pre-Planned 
Product Improvement (P3I), such as:  [Ref. 24] 
1. Automatic target cues or recognizers 
2. Single/multiple target trackers 
3. Image compression 
4. Image feature enhancement and extraction 
5. Image receipt/decompression 
6. Freeze frame forward corrected transmission 
Designing the 2nd Gen FLIR to facilitate future 
improvements in thermal capabilities enables the Army to 
steadily modify vehicular sights at reduced cost. 
5.   Risk 
a. Cost: The cost risk is considered moderate. The 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) EMD contract will help reduce cost 
uncertainties by motivating the contractor to control cost. 
[Ref. 24] 
b. Technical: The program's technical risk is 
considered low to moderate. Since the thermal technology for 
the FLIR already exists, the assessment is low, but integrat- 
ing the B-Kit on multiple platforms will moderately increase 
the program's overall risk. Technical risk is addressed by 
the program's producibility effort.  [Ref. 24] 
c. Schedule Risk: The schedule risk is moderate. A 
detailed B-Kit and A-Kit integration plan reduces the 
program's schedule risk.   Successful joint planning and 
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coordination efforts are critical to minimizing the program's 
potential scheduling conflicts. 
6. Program Schedule 
The 2nd Gen FLIR program moved from initiation of the STF 
in February 1993 to the ASARC Milestone I/II decision in July 
1994. The accelerated timeline was primarily the result of 
extensive modeling and simulation and diligent efforts by the 
2nd Gen FLIR STF and Program Management Office (PMO). Figure 
9 depicts PM FLIR's schedule for developing, producing, and 
integrating the 2nd Gen FLIR B-Kit/sight.  [Ref. 25] 
7. Budgeting and Funding 
The Program Objective Memorandum's (POM) funding level 
for the 2nd Gen FLIR program is outlined in Figure 10.  These 
funding levels are current as of January 1995.   [Ref. 26] 
Funding levels for RDT&E and procurement are reflected for 
both A-Kit and B-Kit. 
D.  ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
1. Program Requirements 
The 2nd Gen FLIR B-Kit will be procured and integrated 
horizontally into the M1A2, M2A3, M8, and LRAS3. A total of 
85 B-Kits and/or sights will be produced for system 
integration and qualification in the EMD phase. (Note that 
the program differentiates between sight systems (M1A2 and M8) 
and B-Kits (M2A3 and LRAS3), but the 2nd Gen FLIR technology 
is common for all platforms.) The A-Kit will be engineered 
concurrently to ensure the FLIR's desired form, fit, and 
function is achieved.  [Ref. 22] 
2. Program Management 
The HTI methodology in the 2nd Gen FLIR program requires 
clearly separating management responsibilities between the 
B-Kit and platform (A-Kit) program offices. The two control- 
ling authorities, PEO IEW (B-Kit) and PEO ASM (A-Kit), signed 
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 5 May 1994 defining the 
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schedule, and performance risk associated with 2nd Gen FLIR 
integration requirements. The management responsibilities are 
outlined as follows:  [Ref. 27] 
a. PEO IEW/PM FLIR is responsible for the B-Kit 
development and test and for supporting production and 
integration of the B-Kit. PM FLIR, through a contract with 
Texas Instruments and Hughes, is also responsible for develop- 
ing and testing the 2nd Gen FLIR for the M1A2 and the M8. 
b. PEO ASM/PM M1A2 is responsible for A-Kit develop- 
ment, test, and production and for integrating and deploying 
the 2nd Gen FLIR in the M1A2. 
c. PEO ASM/PM M2A3 will use the B-Kit in its M2A3 
development, test, and production. 
d. PEO ASM/PM AGS is responsible for A-Kit development, 
test, and production and for integrating and deploying the 2nd 
Gen FLIR in the M8. 
e. PEO IEW/PM-NV/RSTA will use the B-Kit in its LRAS3 
development, test, and production. 
The PEOs also agreed to establishing Team FLIR to provide 
a structured organization for resolving 2nd Gen FLIR integra- 
tion and fielding issues. Team FLIR's proposed structure 
closely resembles the 2nd Gen FLIR's STF. The proposed 
organization is divided into three distinct groups: the 
Executive Steering Committee, Management working Group, and 
Process Action teams. The group's responsibilities and 
composition are:  [Ref. 28] 
a. Executive Steering Committee (ESC): The committee 
will be co-chaired by the Commanding General United Stated 
Army Infantry Center (USAIC), DCSOPS-FD, and ASA (RDA) for 
Systems Management. The committee will include two star level 
representatives from PEOs, the user community (TRADOC), and 
associated DA staff agencies. The ESC provides senior Army 
oversight and direction to the Management Working Group as 
necessary to completely integrate and field the 2nd Gen FLIR. 
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b. Management Working Group (MWG): The group will be 
co-chaired by PM NV/RSTA, Chief of the Dismounted Battlespace 
Battle Lab, and PM ASI. The group will include representa- 
tives from PMOs, TRADOC, Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), 
and associated DA staff agencies. They are primarily respon- 
sible for team integration, interface management and afford- 
ability. They will also provide guidance to the Process 
Action Teams and recommendations to the ESC. 
c. Process Action Teams (PATs): PATs will be estab- 
lished on an as needed basis and composition adjusted appro- 
priately. PM FLIR will be co-team leader of each PAT. PAT'S 
resolve issues presented by the MWG. 
Team FLIR's composition will be adjusted or modified as 
needed. The team will operate until formally dissolved by the 
ESC. 
3.   Quantities to be Procured 
The 2nd Gen FLIR procurement strategy is segregated into 
three separate phases, EMD, LRIP, and Full Rate Production 
(FRP) . The EMD phase requires developing 35 sights and 50 
B-Kits. Development will be contracted through five concur- 
rent contracts: one for developing the items listed below; 
and four individual contracts for developing the platform 
unique A-Kit, performing sight qualification, and conducting 
vehicle performance testing. 
a. EMD Phase: The following list presents a platform 
specific list of the 53 B-Kits/sights to be produced in the 
EMD phase.  [Ref. 22] 
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Number of Units System/Requirement 
13 
Thermal Imaging System (TIS) for M1A2 
GPS 
13 
M1A2 Commanders Independent Thermal 
Viewer (CITV) 
22 
B-Kits for M2A3 Improved Bradley 
Acquisition System (IBAS) 
8 
B-Kit for M2A3 Commanders Independent 
Viewer (CIV) 
9 
Gen Two Sight (GTS) for the M8 
Gunner's Primary Sight Subsystem 
(GPSS) 
14 B-Kit for the LRAS3 
6 
B-Kit for Pre-Production Qualifi- 
cation Test-Contractor (PPQT-C) 
qualification 
b. LRIP Phase: There will be two LRIP contract awards, 
one for approximately 216 B-Kits and the other for approxi- 
mately 240 M1A2 sights. Tentatively, the first LRIP for 
B-Kits will begin in FY 97, followed in FY 98 with the M1A2 
sight LRIP.  [Ref. 22] 
c. Full Rate Production Phase: This phase will produce 
the quantities necessary to equip the force and training base. 
4. Delivery and Performance Period Requirements 
The 2nd Gen FLIR EMD contract is a 42 month Cost-Plus- 
Award-Fee (CPAF) contract. Receiving platform PMs are respon- 
sible for concurrently contracting for A-Kit development with 
their prime contractor. B-Kit/sight qualification is required 
before entering LRIP. A Production Readiness Review (PRR) 
will precede the LRIP IPR and Milestone III decision. The 
LRIP contracts are currently expected to be Firm-Fixed-Price 
(FFP) contracts.  [Ref. 22] 
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5. Test and Evaluation 
The program requires the contractor to perform PPQT-C at 
the critical component, B-Kit, and sight levels. Pre- 
Production qualification Test-Government will be conducted at 
vehicle level and will include performance, EMI/EMP/EMC 
environmental, nuclear testing and system reliability. 
TRADOC Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab's Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment (AWE) will be used during development 
and Initial Operational test and Evaluation (IOT&E) . AWE will 
be conducted in two phases. Phase one involves modeling and 
simulation while phase two is the IOT&E. 
The 2nd Gen FLIR's Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 
provides additional test and evaluation requirements, 
specifications, and milestones. 
6. Contract Competition 
The program's contract competition strategy is addressed 
in each of the production phases. 
a. EMD: The Government released a competitive RFP on 
15 December 1993, using full and open competition procedures. 
A single proposal was received from a Texas Instruments and 
Hughes Aircraft Co. team. This forced the proposal to be 
evaluated as a non-competitive procurement. The Texas 
Instruments and Hughes Co. team was awarded a 48 month EMD 
contract on 7 July 1994. The Government required developing 
two sources for all critical components, delivering product 
specifications and drawings for the B-Kit, sights, and major 
subassemblies with limited data rights.  [Ref. 22] 
Individual platform PM's are required to award A-Kit 
contracts to their prime contractors. This action was deemed 
appropriate based on the Government's and platform contrac- 
tor's experience level. 
b. LRIP: The EMD contract will contain an option for 
two LRIPs which will be awarded non-competitively. LRIP will 
ensure concurrently producing multiple sights and proofing 
the production line for production ramp up.  The Government 
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recognized that it is not cost effective or practical to 
procure these systems from another contractor for LRIP. 
Therefore, a non-competitive contract will be required.  [Ref. 
22] 
An Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) will be incorporated 
into individual platform's Technical Data Packages (TDP) to 
complete system integration. The platform prime contractor 
will receive the B-Kit/sight as Government Furnished Material 
(GFM). It is recognized that failure to provide the B-Kit/ 
sight to meet platform integration schedules poses a signifi- 
cant risk to the program.  [Ref. 22] 
c. Full Rate Production (FRP): A FRP contract will be 
awarded under full and open competition. The Government will 
include data received from the EMD and LRIP phases in its RFP. 
During FRP, the B-Kit/sights will be provided to platform 
prime contractors for integration as Government Furnished 
Property.  [Ref. 22] 
d. Component Breakout: Component breakout will be 
analyzed for use during FRP.  [Ref. 22] 
E.  SUMMARY 
The 2nd Gen FLIR Program provides insight into the 
complexities associated with horizontally integrating 
technology across multiple platforms. The program has 
implemented several management initiatives, such as MOAs, to 
minimize potential risk and coordination problems. However, 
the most difficult aspect of the program still lies ahead. It 
must successfully produce the B-Kit and with the help of a 
separately produced A-Kit, fully integrate the FLIR into each 
of the four platforms identified in the 2nd Gen FLIR's 
Acquisition Plan and Acquisition Strategy. 
The program's strong management base, to include the FLIR 
PMO and Team FLIR, fostered by guidance from key leaders at 
top levels of the Army, will certainly enable the program to 
be successful.  2nd Gen FLIR is helping to further solidify 
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the Army's HTI strategy by applying previously untested 
concepts. 
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IV.  ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to further examine 
critical aspects of the Army's HTI strategy and implementation 
as presented in Chapters II and III. This is accomplished 
through discussing/analyzing issues within the HTI strategy's 
management, operational requirements/performance, and funding 
functions. Each issue is addressed individually, with the 
discussion being followed by a recommendation. The recom- 
mendation is presented as a consideration for future applica- 
tions to the Army's HTI strategy. 
B. MANAGEMENT 
1.   Issue:    Is  the Army's HTI acquisition policy 
sufficient for future programs? 
Since HTI is a new method of modifying or upgrading the 
force, the Army must continue to refine its management 
guidance for implementing the strategy. These policy changes 
must reflect the dynamics of horizontal integration programs. 
The three current enabling strategies have already laid the 
foundation for many future policy improvements. 
HTI programs present extremely complex coordination and 
cooperation requirements. These requirements demand clearly 
defined lines of responsibility among acquisition individuals 
to include users, PMs, contractors, and DA Staff. The 2nd Gen 
FLIR Program implemented a variety of coordination measures in 
support of the program's multiple platform requirement. It is 
one of the first HTI programs to document the extensive coor- 
dination between multiple users, technicians, and PMOs. [Ref. 
25] Despite several uncertainties and unrefined Army 
guidelines, 2nd Gen FLIR continues to set a precedence for 
A-Kit and B-Kit procurement and integration execution. 
HTI acquisition policy must continue to improve as the 
horizontal procurement database grows.   Improvements must 
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allow future HTI programs the flexibility to tailor their 
program to a variety of unique requirements and restrictions. 
This further complicates DA's responsibility to establish firm 
directives and modifications to existing acquisition 
documents. Adapting regulations and policy to a new and 
innovative procurement strategy requires critical review and 
deliberate action. 
Recommendation: The Army needs to scrutinize each HTI 
enabling strategy's Acquisition Plan, Acquisition Strategy, 
and implementation lessons learned in an effort to standard- 
ized HTI procurement policy. Following this review, the 
Army's policy should be refined as appropriate to reflect new 
HTI initiatives, guidelines, and policy. Receiving and 
analyzing feedback is viewed as a critical step in many 
management models. 
2.   Issue:    Need for Executive Involvement /Oversight. 
HTI has quickly gained momentum as an acceptable 
modernization strategy. The strategy's success can be 
attributed to endorsement by the CSA and senior leadership 
throughout the Army. Because of the high level support, HTI 
acceptance continues to trickle down through the ranks of the 
Army, but there are many who remain skeptical of the "horizon- 
tal" approach to modernization. 
If HTI doesn't remain at the top of the CSA's agenda, the 
result could be disastrous for the HTI program. Recall the 
fate of other attempts at common technology integration des- 
cribed in Chapter II. A lack of full acceptance by leaders in 
the Army helped cause the death of these programs. HTI will 
survive only if the strategy receives continued executive 
endorsement, oversight, and participation. 
Recommendation: Involving executive leadership is the 
only way to ensure traditional stovepipe processes adjust to 
accept the HTI modernization strategy.  Involvement requires 
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using the HTI GOWG, STF UAG, and Team ESCs created to facili- 
tate a program's success. Also, periodic progress briefings 
to executive leaders will help HTI retain the power and 
influence needed to break the traditional vertical moderniza- 
tion procedures. Past experience shows that executive 
involvement is critical in the development of new programs 
which involve a deviation from "business as usual." 
3.   Issue:    Is there a need for an HTI Directorate at 
DA and PEO levels? 
Addressing the PEO and DA organizations separately will 
help clarify the discussion. 
a. PEO HTI Office: Initially, the 2nd Gen FLIR Program 
experienced significant coordination difficulties, including 
establishing responsibility for A-Kit development and testing. 
PEO ASM recognized that the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI Program would 
directly affect several platforms under his control. Realizing 
the coordination requirements within his organization, he 
created the PEO ASM HTI Directorate (now PM ASI) as a conduit 
between PEO ASM platform PMs and the 2nd Gen FLIR PM. 
The PEO ASM's decision created a dynamic central manage- 
ment office to facilitate coordination requirements, taskings, 
scheduling, and other horizontal integration issues. PEO 
ASM's HTI Directorate has been commended on its pivotal role 
in the 2nd Gen FLIR's initial development. The office coor- 
dinates HTI issues for PEO ASM with all Army agencies includ- 
ing, DA staff and other PEOs. 
b. DA HTI Office: As the three developing HTI strate- 
gies mature, the need for a small DA HTI office increases. A 
DA HTI office could capture, compile, and assimilate the 
lessons being documented by the HTI programs. The office 
should act as the central authority to initiate and staff 
recommendations for HTI acquisition policy changes. 
The DA HTI Office would provide focused insight into HTI 
process improvements.  They could serve as a DA focal point 
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where issues presented by HTI PMOs, PEO HTI Directorates, and 
other staff agencies can be surfaced and resolved. 
Recommendation: PEOs who have more than one platform 
identified for HTI should consider creating an HTI Director- 
ate, who is responsible for coordinating platform PMs and HTI 
PMs. Also recommended is a temporary DA HTI Office to assess 
HTI programs now in progress and resolve HTI issues. The HTI 
Office's primary directive should be to suggest valid acquisi- 
tion policy reform designed to enhance and facilitate the 
future implementation of HTI strategies. Perhaps PEO ASM set 
a precedence for allocating resources to ensure successful 
management of the HTI strategy. 
4.   Issue:    Is  there potential  for  cross-Service 
utilization of the Army's HTI Strategy? 
For certain strategies, like Digitization, a DoD joint 
effort seems appropriate. Numerous historical examples exist 
where the lack of common capabilities was detrimental to 
accomplishing the mission. A prime example is the incident in 
Grenada, where a U.S. soldier was unable to call for fire 
support, because his communication system was incompatible 
with that used by the firing units. The soldier finally used 
a telephone to complete the fire mission. Can the Services 
continue to operate in a stovepipe world much as the Army has 
for years, or is it time to focus on a more functional hori- 
zontal method to modernize all services? 
The logical successor to the Army's HTI strategy would be 
a DoD HTI strategy. Efforts have been taken to make this 
vision a reality. Recently, the Marine Corps joined the Army 
in its Digitization of the Battlefield HTI Strategy. There 
are other examples of cross-Service integration in equipment 
procurement, including the SINGARS radio. Horizontal Tech- 
nology Integration for the DoD has significant potential for 
improving common situational awareness across the entire 
combined arms battlefield and reducing LCC for the entire 
military. 
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Recommendation:  The Army must continue to present its 
HTI strategy to DoD's executive leadership.   It is DoD's 
responsibility to analyze the potential for HTI implementation 
across Service boundaries.  Review for Joint application is 
consistent with guidance and recommendations from the Packard 
Commission and subsequent Defense Management Reviews. 
5.   Issue:    Will HTI increase or decrease a program's 
schedule risk. 
This issue was presented in Chapter II as an advantage of 
the HTI program. However, consolidating of the development 
effort for a particular piece of equipment, such as the 2nd 
Gen FLIR, has the potential to increase risk. 
If systems are vertically procured there are separate 
development and test schedules. Under HTI, these schedules 
are consolidated into one development and test plan, thereby 
reducing the number of possible schedule slips or problems. 
However, if the HTI program's schedule slips, all platforms 
are affected. This leads to concern that HTI programs may, in 
fact, increase the risk of schedule slips for all systems. 
However, HTI does help reduce overlapping management 
requirements and problems related to separate programs. 
Consolidation also focuses the PMO's effort on specific 
problems, such as scheduling, benefiting multiple platforms 
simultaneously. The potential payoffs of horizontal integra- 
tion offset the price of schedule risk. 
Recommendation: The Army must carefully consider each 
program identified for possible HTI application. Risk 
associated with the technology's development must be analyzed. 
Programs with low to moderate development risk may be more 
easily adapted to horizontal integration than a high risk 
program. Risk management considerations are outlined in the 
Defense Systems Management College's publication, Risk Manage- 
ment  Concepts and Guidance. 
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C.  OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS/PERFORMANCE 
1.   Issue:    Redefining the ORD for HTI 
According to current DoD and Army policy, the require- 
ments in traditional ORDs are stated in operational terms. 
The material developer then converts those operational terms 
into performance specifications to produce the desired piece 
of equipment. This is the standard ORD process for vertically 
developing equipment. In contrast, an HTI ORD is designed to 
combine the requirements of several platforms, in an effort to 
produce a common piece of equipment.  [Ref. 19] 
First, each platform's ORD is reviewed to identify 
pertinent requirements. This entails looking at on-board 
weapon systems and identifying common and optimum capabilities 
that will satisfy all of the platforms. Then, working within 
the physical constraints of the platforms and the capability 
and constraints of the technology, analysis determines tech- 
nical options. Once the available options are identified, a 
Trade-Off-Analysis (TOA) determines which common features can 
be put in all of the platforms to reduce logistics and 
optimize warfighting capability. The final step, and probably 
the most difficult, is obtaining a consensus from all pro- 
ponent combat developers before preparing the HTI ORD.  [Ref. 
19] 
Recommendation: That Army policy and regulations be 
adapted to incorporate the different HTI ORD structure. Make 
TRADOC one of the approval authorities on performance specifi- 
cations, statements of work, and acquisition plans to enhance 
the HTI program's continuity.  [Ref. 19] 
2. Issue: Does HTI restrict the operational capa- 
bility of platforms designated to receive 
the HTI technology? 
This issue strikes at the very precept of HTI. Will 
horizontally integrating the Army's equipment be the "best" 
method of modernizing the CSA's Force XXI or is the tradi- 
tional vertical method still the optimal choice? 
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There are individuals in the acquisition community who 
feel that using common technology in multiple platforms 
restricts the overall development of the individual systems. 
It is true that all platforms identified for HTI are bound by 
the operational requirements outlined in the "common" ORD. 
Therefore, it would seem critical for the designated STF to 
include the proper representation from the user, PMO, and DA 
staff for each platform receiving HTI. 
The ORD process discussed in the previous issue statement 
clearly shows that each platform's specific operational 
requirements are considered for integration into the final HTI 
ORD. However, as pointed out by HTI opponents, some systems 
may actually be forced to accept a compromise in total system 
performance and integration, to facilitate the HTI moderniza- 
tion plan. The level of compromise a system may be forced to 
accept depends on the individual program, technology being 
integrated, and platforms identified in the ORD for integra- 
tion. 
Certainly, the Army's decision makers are aware of the 
limitations HTI may place on certain systems identified for 
HTI. However, their overriding concern is to obtain a modern- 
ized force with common capabilities, that is cost effective 
and still meets the Force XXI requirements. Even though 
horizontal integration may restrict an individual system's 
performance potential, the benefit of common situational 
awareness and information transfer across multiple systems is 
overwhelming. 
Recommendation: STF membership must include representa- 
tion from each HTI platform's users, PMOs, and DA staff. As 
explained earlier, the Army's leadership must continue to 
emphasize the positive aspects of HTI. They must hold 
platform PMs responsible for successfully integrating the HTI 
technology in their system. 
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D.  FUNDING AND COST 
1.   Issue:    Is current Army funding policy adequate 
for HTI programs? 
When the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI program began, the STF and PMO 
noted that DA funding policy inadequately addressed the 
program's budgeting needs. The program experienced consider- 
able confusion over distributing and controlling program funds 
between B-Kit and A-Kit PMs. The problems were amplified when 
PM FLIR was given the additional responsibility of developing 
the A-Kit for selected platforms.  [Ref. 19] 
Chapter II presented three DA funding management pro- 
posals. These recommendations were based on potential funding 
needs and only superficially solved the program's funding 
difficulties. 2nd Gen FLIR has since successfully negotiated 
some of the funding tribulations inherent in a new acquisition 
strategy. 
Some HTI programs will use the A/B Kit configuration, 
while others may incorporate alternative integration methods. 
Each program must retain the flexibility to adapt program 
funding to their specific requirements, within the framework 
of DA policy. Therefore, DA policy should provide several 
funding initiatives to allow tailoring for varying HTI 
programs. 
Recommendation:  DA should review the fund management 
techniques executed by the 2nd Gen FLIR PMO, to establish firm 
HTI funding management policy to curtail problems encountered 
in distributing program funds. 
2. Issue: Will HTI give the expected LCC benefit 
compared to traditional procurement 
programs? 
The analysis for this issue references the 2nd Gen FLIR 
cost analysis conducted by the Dismounted Battlespace Battle 
Lab, TRADOC Analysis Command, and White Sands Missile Range. 
This study compares the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI procurement cost to 
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a traditional stovepipe 2nd Gen FLIR procurement.  The facts 
and assumptions of the study are:  [Ref. 30] 
• Initial 2nd Gen FLIR effort is for 6251 FLIRs 
1079 M1A2, 1602 M2A3, 239 M8, and 650 LRAS3 
Includes two each (FLIRs) for Abrams and 
Bradley 
• Fixed Costs 
In HTI, apportioned across four systems 
In stovepipe (STP), charged to each separate 
system 
• A-Kit testing was relatively equivalent for the HTI 
or STP approach 
• B-Kit testing 
In HTI, apportioned across four systems 
In STP, charged to each system 
• Acquisition schedules were  the  same  for both 
procurement methods (HTI or STP) 
• Costs are in FY95 millions of dollars 
Figure 11 is the LCC of both procurement strategies 
separated into the four life-cycle categories and a LCC total. 
Common component development reduces RDTE costs compared to 
separate components for multiple systems. These savings, plus 
savings from economies of scale in the HTI production method, 
helped create a combined saving of 22% over the STP method. 
Figure 12 is the LCC of HTI and STP procurement categor- 
ized by individual system. The most startling figure is the 
56% savings estimated for the AGS 2nd Gen FLIR. The savings 
result from economies of scale obtained through HTI procure- 
ment. If AGS developed and produced the 2nd Gen FLIR indepen- 
dently, the AGS program would only develop and produce 23 9 
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FLIRs. Therefore, AGS benefits from horizontally integrating 
the 2nd Gen FLIR across multiple systems. 
The overall LCC savings for the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI program 
are estimated at $565.35 million or 22.2% above the STP 
program. Although these figures are significant, several 
leaders in the Army believe this estimate to be conservative. 
They believe the actual HTI savings to be closer to 3 0% above 
traditional STP acquisition programs. 
Recommendation: Conduct a follow-up cost analysis once 
the 2nd Gen FLIR HTI program completes the EMD phase. This 
will validate or disprove the cost estimates presented by the 
Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab analysis. Analysis review 
and documentation is the last step in the estimation process. 
[Ref. 31] 
E.  SUMMARY 
The preceding sections of this chapter discussed/analyzed 
several HTI issues. First, HTI management concerns were 
addressed. Next, the focus was on HTI performance/operational 
requirements discussion. Finally, funding and cost issues 
were presented, including a cost comparison analysis of HTI 
and stovepipe procurement methods. Each issue was concluded 
by a recommendation aimed at improving the Army's HTI strategy 
and stimulating follow-up research. However, the issues 
presented in this chapter are not a comprehensive list of HTI 
concerns. They represent the most common questions arising 
from the HTI strategy's policy and implementation. 
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V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this research effort was to document the HTI 
concept and how this concept has been implemented by the 2nd 
Gen FLIR program. 
As a new and emerging modernization strategy, HTI has 
received limited research and documentation.  HTI's enabling 
strategies are far from complete, but they offer solid 
information on HTI implementation. 
This thesis combines the general concept of the HTI 
strategy with the practical experience of an HTI program to 
give greater breadth and continuity to understanding this new 
procurement methodology. This was accomplished by interview- 
ing key HTI personnel and extensively researching the HTI 
strategy and the 2nd Gen FLIR program. The following conclu- 
sions, recommendations, and areas for further research are 
based on the study. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1.   HTI is a viable acquisition strategy for moderniz- 
ing and upgrading the combined arms force. 
The HTI concept was introduced to augment, not supplant, 
the traditional stovepipe modernization process. At a time 
when budgets are steadily decreasing, alternative procurement 
methods are being sought to increase the value for each 
acquisition/modernization dollar spent. HTI, as an alterna- 
tive acquisition strategy, provides the Army significant LCC 
savings through economies of scale and long-term logistical 
supportability. 
HTI helps the Army meet its Force XXI modernization goal 
of common situational awareness across the force. With the 
coming Information Age, a common view of the battlefield 
becomes critical to mission accomplishment. Using the 
horizontal integration strategy increases lethality, reduces 
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fratricide, and enhances command and control through common 
information sharing.   HTI ensures multiple systems are 
outfitted with the common hardware, software, and protocols 
necessary to facilitate information transmission, reception, 
and assimilation. 
The Army's HTI strategy is still in its early development 
stage, with significant improvements needed to refine its 
policy and guidelines.   However, HTI is an acquisition 
strategy that has the potential to bridge the gap between 
reduced procurement funding, acquisition streamlining, and the 
Army's modernization goals. 
2.   HTI does have potential as a Joint Acquisition 
Strategy. 
The HTI strategy holds tremendous potential for expanding 
across Service boundaries. Not only does the Army need to 
effectively communicate internally, it must communicate to 
other Services with equal ease. Rapid information transfers 
and common situational awareness serve as combat multipliers 
on the multi-Service battlefield. 
With significantly reduced personnel, Joint operations 
have become more of a necessity than a luxury. The increased 
interaction required in multi-Service operations creates more 
opportunities for fratricide and devastating command and 
control breakdowns. HTI gives the same advantages to the 
Joint operations scenario as it does to the Army, the ability 
to win decisively on the battlefield with minimum casualties. 
However, there are significantly more obstacles in 
developing a horizontal integration program when more than one 
Service is included. For instance, generating an ORD will 
become extremely complex when the individual Service's mission 
requirements are addressed. Although many of the problems 
seem insurmountable, the rewards will be great if concessions 
and agreements can be reached. 
DoD must analyze the success of the Army's HTI strategy 
to ascertain its Joint applications.  As the Army's strategy 
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matures, more policy and implementation procedures may be 
transferable to cross-Service integration programs. Cautious 
and deliberate steps must be taken to properly integrate the 
Services to inter-operational levels. 
3. Conduct analysis of total system performance 
requirements before each platform is selected for 
horizontal integration. 
If the Army expects to benefit from common modules, some 
performance trade-offs must be expected. In Chapter IV this 
study described the ORD development process. During the HTI 
ORD process, each platform's integration requirements are 
presented, analyzed, and consolidated. The common module is 
developed from the most stringent specifications of the 
consolidated requirements. The common specification should 
produce the best design for any platform. Unfortunately, not 
every specification is applicable across the spectrum of 
platforms. Therefore, individual system performance may 
actually be compromised by the integration process. 
The Army's leadership must accept some performance trade- 
offs to attain the commonality benefits. As seamless 
information transference becomes almost a requirement, this 
trade-off becomes more of an imperative than an option. 
Although total system performance must be carefully analyzed, 
commonality through systems integration remains one of the 
Army's prime modernization directives. The level of compro- 
mise acceptable for an individual system is the critical 
question to answer in the pre-selection platform analysis. 
4. Current DA policy does not adequately address HTI 
program requirements. 
DA policy was designed to accommodate the traditional 
stovepipe process that drives our procurement programs. The 
three enabling strategies now in progress have adhered to DA 
policy whenever possible, but significant deviations have been 
required. As a new acquisition strategy, departures from 
traditional policy are expected. 
57 
DA needs to incorporate issues, such as funding and HTI 
acquisition streamlining, in policy amendments. If new HTI 
policy is not united with acquisition reform, the process will 
become cumbersome and difficult like current processes. The 
bottomline is: HTI holds tremendous potential as a method to 
streamline force modernization if DA policy reflects the 
operational needs of the new strategy. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conduct cost/benefit analysis of the three HTI 
enabling strategies in progress to validate 
anticipated savings and benefits from component 
commonality. 
As the three HTI programs mature, cost data will be 
available for follow-up comparative cost studies with vertical 
acquisition programs. Near-term studies need to address 
initial development and production cost. Long-term projects 
need to be developed as HTI products are fielded and operation 
and support cost data becomes available. These studies will 
verify the projected LCC savings achieved through economies of 
scale and long-term logistical supportability. Without 
thorough cost/benefit analysis the HTI strategy will never 
realize its full potential or acceptance. 
2. Form a DA HTI Office to accept, analyze, and 
process recommended changes to DA acquisition 
policy. 
The Army's HTI framework is new and untested. Procedural 
lessons are being learned from the enabling strategies.  A 
central DA HTI Office is imperative to capture and synthesize 
these lessons for prospective policy adjustments. 
The DA HTI Office should also be a champion of the 
strategy. They can provide information briefings to top 
executives on implemented and projected HTI programs. Other 
tasks may include DA level actions required by key committees, 
such as the GOWG.  A DA HTI Office is warranted and should 
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prove invaluable as the Army's latest acquisition strategy- 
continues to evolve. 
3.   Army leadership must continue to endorse the HTI 
strategy. 
Endorsement of the HTI strategy by top Army executives 
requires continually recognizing the program and participating 
in several Executive Committees identified in this study. 
Direct involvement propels the HTI strategy to the forefront 
of the CSA's modernization agenda. 
Only support from the highest levels of the Army enables 
HTI to break vertical process barriers. Remember, the HTI 
process is a new management philosophy which is slowly gaining 
acceptance in the acquisition community. Unfortunately, key 
elements to the program's success, such as complete platform 
PM cooperation, remain a challenge to HTI PMs. Only continued 
emphasis and education throughout the Army's hierarchy will 
ensure that HTI remains an alternative procurement strategy 
for force modernization. 
D.  ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study proposed to answer the following research 
questions.  The questions and their answers appear below: 
1. Primary Research Question 
How is  the Army implementing an HTI procurement 
strategy? 
The Army's HTI procurement policy is detailed in Chapter 
II. This chapter outlines the proposed procedure for an HTI 
program's initiation and execution. The 2nd Gen FLIR case 
study in Chapter III describes one HTI program's implementa- 
tion of the Army's policy. 
2. Subsidiary Question One 
What  is HTI and what HTI procurement policy has   the 
Army adopted? 
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The HTI concept is defined and explained in Chapter II of 
this study. Chapter II also outlines the Army's current HTI 
acquisition guidance and policy. 
3. Subsidiary Question Two 
What is  the HTI process  from development  to production? 
The Army's guidance on the HTI process is outlined in 
Chapter II of this study. The 2nd Gen FLIR study describes 
one HTI program's progress through the Army's HTI process. 
However, the 2nd Gen FLIR program has just entered the EMD 
phase of development, limiting the availability of production 
data. 
4. Subsidiary Question Three 
What are the exact responsibilities of the PMs involved 
in HTI,   specifically HTI component PMs and platform PMs? 
The response to this question is found in chapter III. 
However, this case only presents one example of responsibility 
division among the PMs.  Individual HTI programs will tailor 
PM responsibilities based on specific component and platform 
circumstances and requirements. 
5. Subsidiary Question Four 
What changes to the Army's existing policy will improve 
the overall HTI procurement process? 
Several of the Army's HTI policy issues and concerns are 
addressed in Chapter IV of this study. Each issue is 
discussed and analyzed to provide a recommendation for 
improving or building on the HTI strategy. 
6. Subsidiary Question Five 
What  is  2nd Gen FLIR?    How,   why,   and when  did  the  2nd 
Gen    FLIR    become    an    HTI    program?        What    is    its    current 
Acquisition Strategy,   specifically HTI requirements? 
The response to this question is found in Chapter III of 
this study.  It describes 2nd Gen FLIR and the program's 
historical background, and reviews the program's Acquisition 
Strategy and Acquisition Plan. 
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E.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Analyze  the  effect  of  the  HTI  process  on 
contractors. 
2. Joint application of the HTI strategy by DoD. 
3. Use of CAD and simulation in the HTI process. 
4. Comparative analysis of two or three current HTI 
enabling strategies. 
5. Horizontal and vertical acquisition cost comparison. 
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Advanced Warfighting Experiment 
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Gunner's Primary Sight Subsystem 
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Headquarters, Department of the Army 
Horizontal Technology Integration 
Improved Bradley Acquisition System 
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare 
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Integrated Program Summary 
Life Cycle Cost 
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Memorandum of Agreement 
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2ND Gen FLIR 
Operational Requirements Document 
Process Action Team 
Preliminary Design Review 
Program Element 
Program Executive Officer 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Product Manager/Program Manager/Project Manager 
Pre-Production Qualification Test-Contractor 
Pre-Production Qualification Test-Government 
Production Readiness Review 
Request For Proposal 
Senior Executive Service 
Statement of Work 
Special Study Number 
Special Task Force 
Stovepipe Process 
Technical Data Package 
Test and Evaluation Command 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Trade-Off-Analysis 
Training and Doctrine Command 
User Advisory Group 
United States Army Infantry Center 
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 
Second Generation Forward Looking InfraRed 
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